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Peter Bursens en Jana Deforche 
Universiteit Antwerpen 
 
1 Introduction. 
 
Europeanization has become a central concept in EU studies. The proliferation of 
studies using Europeanization as a guiding principle brought the concept to the attention of 
many scholars of European integration and comparative politics. At the same time, however, 
the frequent use of the concept caused confusion about its exact meaning and scope, forcing 
authors to make their particular interpretation clear from the beginning of every single paper. 
So do we: in this paper we understand Europeanization as the domestic adaptation to 
European integration (Vink and Graziano 2007). In addition, we support the claim that the 
basic mechanism at work in Europeanization processes is that ‘European integration leads to 
pressures to adjust (goodness of fit) which are then mediated by domestic-level factors, and 
finally to outcomes’ (Caporaso 2007: 27; see also Risse et alii 2001). Research designs that 
look into the exact adaptation processes at play have been applied to a wide set of polity and 
politics features (such as state structures, executives, parliaments and parties) and policy 
sectors (such as environmental and social policies). This paper is operationalized along the 
lines of these research designs. 
 
Europeanization studies try to explain if, why and how domestic politics and policies 
change under the pressure of European integration. Europeanization, defined as adaptation to 
European integration, therefore, is the explanandum or the empirical phenomenon one seeks 
to understand and explain. Because of reasons of tautology, it follows that Europeanization 
cannot be the theory from which hypotheses can be derived to explain the domestic 
adaptation. We need other theoretical propositions to understand the adaptation process. In his 
overview of the literature, Bulmer (2007) finds that the vast majority of scholars use some 
kind of institutional theory as explanans for the empirical phenomenon of Europeanization 
(cf. also Cowles et alii 2001, Knill 2001, Börzel 2002, Featherstone and Radaelli 2003, Börzel 
2005). All three strands of new institutionalism (rational choice, historical and sociological)   3
have been extensively applied in Europeanization research. In this paper the theoretical 
frameworks of the different institutionalisms are central, thus supporting Bulmer’s claim that 
‘an awareness of the institutionalisms is indispensable for understanding how Europeanization 
works’ (Bulmer 2007: 51). 
 
Graziano and Vink’s edited volume (2007) offers an exhaustive overview of studies in 
realm of Europeanization. Several contributors to this volume come to the conclusion that 
analyses of the adaptation of domestic policies are overrepresented subjects in the impressive 
number of Europeanization studies so far. Much less attention has been devoted to the 
changes in national policy-making and even less to developments in subnational policy-
making. This paper can be perceived as lying on the verge of the mainstream Europeanization 
literature. More in particular it seeks to test some of the propositions put forward by 
institutional theory, but with respect to politics at the subnational level and in two different 
policy sectors. Our research puzzle is if and how the domestic variables put forward by 
rational and sociological institutionalism play a role in the adaptation process of subnational 
authorities in the area of environmental and agricultural policy-making. This focus on the 
subnational level helps to fill a caveat in the Europeanization literature: the subnational level 
has so far not received much attention (with the exception of some work by Falkner (2001) 
and Börzel (2002)). In addition, we will not examine the adaptation of German or Austrian 
Länder (as in the work of Falkner and Börzel), but of the Belgian Regions and with respect to 
two concrete EU policy issues:  
Council Regulation 318/2006/EC of 20 February 2006 on the common organization of 
the markets in the sugar sector  
Directive 2002/49/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 25 June 2002 
relating to the assessment and management of environmental noise.   
 
2 Design 
 
The purpose of this contribution is to test whether hypotheses derived from rational 
choice and sociological institutionalism can predict the way subnational authorities adapt to 
specific European policy initiatives. In order to do so, the paper uses the classic three step 
model of Europeanization research (cf  Risse et alii 2001, Caporaso 2007). This model starts 
from the observation that the European integration process delivers a substantial amount of 
policy output at the European Union level. Especially within the supranational policy areas,   4
EU output generates pressure upon the member states to respond to European policy 
initiatives. Put differently, in a second stage this pressure creates a degree of fit or misfit 
between the European and the national level. There is, however, no linear relation assumed 
between the European and the national level. In a third step, several intervening or mediating 
variables shape the eventual way the domestic level adapts to the European pressure. 
Although there’s much criticism to putting the goodness of fit concept central to a 
Europeanization research design (Heritier and Knill 2001; Haverland 2000), we argue that its 
use is justified in our particular design because we are dealing with two binding European 
policies that clearly require the domestic (including the subnational) level to adapt in terms of 
policy-making and policy-content (Börzel 2005: 51-52; Bulmer 2007: 52). The degree of fit 
or misfit defines the adaptation pressure and ultimately the way domestic politics responds. 
Institutional theory becomes relevant with respect to the mechanisms through which the 
domestic factors shape the adaptation. Based on an institutional framework, hypotheses can 
be formulated as to how domestic variables influence the adaptation process. In the next 
paragraph we will formulate such hypotheses with respect to how the Flemish Region 
responds to pressure from EU environmental and agriculture laws. 
 
3 Europeanization and institutionalism: goodness of fit and domestic mediating factors 
3.1 Goodness of fit  
 
Most Europeanization literature now agrees that the impact of European integration 
will not lead to a high degree of convergence in the political systems of the member states. On 
the contrary, enduring differences are expected between member states’ political institutions, 
policy-making procedures and policies. Mainstream Europeanization literature claims that this 
divergence can be explained by the unequal goodness of fit between the European level on the 
one hand and the substantial variance among the large number of national and subnational 
political arenas on the other hand (cf. Börzel 2005). The goodness of fit concept refers to the 
degree of compatibility between EU-level structures, norms, practices and their domestic 
(national and subnational) counterparts. The greater the differences between the different 
levels, the more domestic institutions or norms are put under pressure to change in order to 
live up to the European requirements. In short, misfit causes differential adaptation pressure 
(Risse et alii 2001) and ‘the lower the compatibility between European and domestic 
processes, policies and institutions, the higher is the adaptational pressure Europe exerts on 
the member states’ (Börzel 2005: 50). Misfit appears in two kinds: policy and institutional   5
misfit (Börzel and Risse 2003). In the case of policy misfit, there is a deviation between the 
content of the EU policies and the existing national legislation. In this case, the pressure for 
the member states largely comes down to the installation of effective compliance strategies. 
Institutional misfit refers to the absence of an institutional framework perceived as necessary 
to deal with European integration in general. Domestic patterns that are challenged then 
include power balances between institutions (e.g. legislative – executive), relations between 
government levels (e.g. national – subnational) and actors (e.g. interest groups – public 
authorities). In this paper we deal with the larger scope of institutional misfit. Goodness of fit, 
however, is only a necessary condition for adaptation. Knill and Lenschow (1998), for 
instance, found in their analysis of four environmental directives in the UK and Germany that 
only three out of eight cases were in line with the pure goodness of fit hypothesis. Gerda 
Falkner and a group of researchers also argue that simple causal relations do not hold and that 
the outcome of transposition is determined by a complex web of administrative, institutional 
and actor-based factors (Falkner et al. 2002; Falkner et al. 2005). Their analysis of the 
implementation of six directives in fifteen member states resulted in a typology of three 
“worlds of compliance”, clusters of countries with a similar transposition pattern. More in 
general, various empirical studies pointed out that there is no correlation between the degree 
of misfit and the adaptation of the political system of the different member states. Other 
scenarios can be thought of: adaptation pressure can be so intensive that adaptation to the 
European level becomes rather impossible while, on the contrary, weak adaptation pressure 
can lead to substantial changes. 
 
In short, it has become clear that member states responses depend on their respective 
domestic constellations. Adaptation doesn’t occur automatically but is mediated through a 
range of intervening factors which facilitate or hamper adaptation to European demands. 
Which features of these domestic constellations one expects to matter and how their impact is 
expected to come about depends on the theoretical stand one takes. Different institutional 
theories have developed their own particular expectations. Bulmer (2007: 50-53) distinguishes 
in this respect the three classical institutionalisms (rational, sociological and historical) while 
Börzel (2005: 52-58) discriminates between resource dependency (rational) theories, 
socialization approaches and organizational theory. In this paper we will use insights of the 
different institutional frameworks to develop concrete hypotheses with respect to the 
adaptation of the Flemish subnational level.   
   6
So far, we identified the independent variable (European integration), the intervening 
variables (domestic features) and the mechanism through which they operate (goodness of 
fit). Now, we turn to the dependent variable: how do we operationalize domestic adaptation? 
A classical typology of dimensions of domestic change is the one between polity, politics and 
policies. While this is a sound distinction from an analytical perspective, in reality, of course, 
these dimensions cannot be discerned in absolute terms. We define adaptation in this paper as 
the capability of shaping and taking of European policies on the subnational level (cf. Börzel 
2003). To what extent is the Flemish governmental level capable of proactive behaviour 
towards the European level? Is it able to define its position in time and to defend it through a 
various number of channels? Is it capable to install efficient coordination and representation 
mechanisms for European policy-making?    
 
3.2 Institutionalism: domestic level mediating factors  
 
In the following section we derive some concrete theoretical hypotheses from 
institutionalist theory with regard to the shaping and taking capacity of the Flemish 
governmental level. These hypotheses formulate predictions with respect to the way Flanders 
handles concrete EU policy issues. Most institutionalist literature deals with the level of the 
central government. This paper goes beyond this traditional focus because it aims to test 
whether the insights of institutionalism can survive in the case of the subnational 
governmental level. In the following we discuss the origins and the mechanisms of the 
intermediating variables and present hypotheses with respect to how they determine the 
shaping and taking capacities (i.e. the adaptation) of the Flemish subnational level.  
 
According to institutional theory, the behaviour of actors is constrained or even 
determined by institutions, defined as principles, rules and norms that structure their 
interactions during the policy process (Featherstone and Kazamias 2003). In this paper we use 
insights of both rational choice and sociological institutionalism. Rational choice 
institutionalism explores in which ways actors’ preferences are oriented towards institutional 
settings or rules. In response to developments at the European level, patterns of power 
relationships between domestic actors change. The most important intermediating variables 
coming from rational choice institutionalism and aspiring to explain how adaptation occurs in 
specific member states or policy domains are multiple veto players and supporting formal   7
institutions. Next to these mainstream variables, we include administrative capacity as an 
additional factor with origins in the ‘logic of consequentiality’ of rational choice theory.  
 
The focus of sociological institutionalist theory is on norms, ideas, discourse, 
organizational structure and the psychology of politics (Bulmer 2006). The sociological 
perspective of institutionalism points at norm entrepreneurs and cooperative informal 
institutions mobilizing in favor of adaptation (Vink and Graziano 2006). The presence or the 
absence of these two intermediating factors is expected to explain the scope of member states’ 
and subnational regions’ internalization of European norms (Börzel 2005). The ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ behind these two factors is the process of persuasion during which 
persuasive norm entrepreneurs and a consensus-oriented or cooperative political decision-
making culture lead to socialization and social learning (Featherstone and Kazamias, 2003). 
Again we include one extra variable within the sociological institutionalist logic as we expect 
issue salience to play an intervening role as well. In the following paragraphs, we will 
elaborate on these six variables. 
 
Multiple veto points 
The concept of multiple veto points refers to the fact that a large number of actors is 
necessary to make decisions, in our case here, with respect to dealing with an EU policy issue. 
Multiple veto points can obstruct or slow down national adaptation in response to European 
pressure (Tsebilis 1995, Haverland 2000, Héritier et al 2001, Börzel 2005). Domestic actors 
with institutional or de facto veto points can prevent adaptation to take place. More in 
particular, the number of veto players determines the size of the ‘domestic win-set’. The more 
veto-players, the smaller the size of the domestic win set tends to be and the stronger the 
bargaining power of the national government (Putnam 1988, Börzel 2003). Hence, when the 
political power in the political system is shared among many actors, it will be more difficult to 
mobilize enough actors to pull through changes. The less institutional or de facto veto players 
are involved in a policy case, the easier it is to foster the domestic ‘winning coalition’, which 
is a necessary condition for smooth shaping and taking of EU policy, i.e. for adaptation. 
  
Hypothesis 1: the less institutional or de facto veto players, the higher the capacity for 
institutional change 
 
Facilitating formal institutions   8
Facilitating formal institutions can, contrary to multiple veto points, stimulate 
domestic structural change. According to Risse, Cowles and Caporaso (2001), existing 
facilitating formal institutions can provide the necessary resources to facilitate domestic 
adaptation. These resources can be material or ideational and can only be used when the 
necessary action capacity is available. It is exactly this action capacity which is offered by 
formal facilitating institutions (Börzel 2005). The existence of formal political and 
administrative cooperation mechanisms is an example of such facilitating formal institutions: 
formal and regular meetings of ‘European experts’ of administrative units and/or political 
cabinets to follow-up European dossiers and to develop common positions.   
 
Hypothesis 2: the more facilitating formal institutions, the more up- and downloading 
capacity with regard to European policies will exist. 
 
Administrative capacity 
According to Börzel (2002), the capacity of member states to shape and take European 
policies depends upon the administrative capacity to deal with EU policies. Among others, 
administrative capacity refers to staff-power, financial resources, expertise, coalition building 
skills and concentration of competences. All of these can determine uploading and 
downloading of EU policies. The relation is straightforward: the more administrative capacity, 
the higher chances are that shaping and taking of EU policies will be fluent and effective.  
 
Hypothesis 3: the more elaborated the administrative capacity, the smoother the 
shaping and taking of European policy will be. 
  
Norm entrepreneurs 
The presence of norm entrepreneurs makes domestic adaptation more likely. Norm 
entrepreneurs mobilize other domestic actors by persuading them to reshape their identity and 
interests in the light of new European norms and rules. Börzel (2005) makes a distinction 
between two types: epistemic communities, which legitimize themselves by scientific 
knowledge (Haas, 1992) and advocacy networks, which are bound together by firm 
conviction. The motivation behind both types is different, but their effect on the changing 
capacity of the domestic institutional setting is similar. Their presence or absence shape the 
extent to which member states or subnational regions internalize European norms (Börzel   9
2005). The ‘logic of appropriateness’ behind this is a process of persuasion: persuasive norm 
entrepreneurs lead to socialization and social learning  of others (Featherstone and Kazamias, 
2003).  
 
Hypothesis 4: the more the number and skills of norm entrepreneurs, the better up- 
and downloading capacities of domestic (sub)national governments  
 
Cooperative informal institutions 
Cooperative informal institutions are collective understandings that strongly influence 
the way in which domestic actors respond to adaptation pressures. These informal institutions 
make domestic actors internalize European rules, norms and views more easily. A cooperative 
political culture is an informal facilitating and intermediating factor that, on the one hand, 
prevents actors from vetoing and, on the other hand, divides the costs of the adaptation 
between the winners and losers of the adaptation (Börzel 2005, Risse e.a., 2001). The 
presence of such cooperative informal institutions increases the chance of fluent shaping and 
taking of EU policy. The process by which this takes place is again social learning (cf. the 
mechanism through which norm entrepreneurs work). A typical example is the Belgian 
consensual culture, which is conducive to consensus-building and burden-sharing. 
  
Hypothesis 5: the more informal cooperative institutions, the more adapting capacity 
of the domestic institutional structure  
 
Issue Salience 
The last domestic mediating variable is issue salience which refers to the visibility and 
the importance of the European issue at stake. An issue is salient when it catches much 
attention. Media coverage can, for example, be an indicator (Knill, 1997). Behind this concept 
lies the assumption that visibility of an issue triggers active response by domestic political 
actors. Issue salience can function as a constraining or impeding factor in case of low salience 
and as a stimulating or strengthening factor in case of high salience (Versluis 2004).  
 
Hypothesis 6: the more salient the European issue, the more efficient the shaping and 
taking of the policy will be. 
   10
Table 1 summarizes the list of domestic variables and schematically presents the 
operational design of the paper. The next sections discusses the empirical data with respect to 
the Flemish adaptation in the two cases. 
 
Table 1: design 
  
 
noise directive   sugar regulation  
degree of adaptation       
type of misfit  policy misfit 
institutional misfit 
  
domestic variables  H1: veto-players  
H2: facilitating formal institutions 
H3: administrative resources 
H4: norm entrepreneurs  
H5: facilitating  informal institutions 
H6: issue salience 
  
 
 
4. Flemish shaping and taking capacities in the sugar regulation and the noise directive 
 
Europeanization research designs roughly allow for two types of comparisons: 
between countries (or subnational entities) and between policy domains or issues (Knill 
2001). In his overview, Treib (2006) claims that designs with an explicit focus on a cross-
sectoral policy comparison are underrepresented. This paper can therefore be seen as a 
contribution to the sectoral comparison design. In addition, it includes empirical material on 
the uploading and downloading of a directive and a regulation. Since regulations have not 
received that much of attention in Europeanization and implementation research (Treib 2006), 
this paper can shed new light on the application of the goodness of fit and the impact of 
domestic mediating factors in the case of direct applicable European laws.  
 
The sugar reform regulation and the directive on environmental noise are part of the 
strongly integrated but differently organized agriculture and environmental policy domains 
(Knill 2001; Anderson 2003). While environmental policy is dominantly regulating of 
character, agricultural policy has important redistributive effects as well. In both sectors,   11
however, the EU exerts adaptation pressure, not only on the Belgian federal government, but 
also on the subnational level since Belgian Regions are largely competent for agriculture and 
environmental policy. The complex division of competences has major consequences for the 
adaptation process. It often takes as many as four governmental levels to formulate a single 
Belgian position to be defended at the European level (Baetens, Helsen et al. 2005). In 
addition, this position needs to be confirmed through coordination meetings organized by the 
federal Ministry of Foreign Policy (Beyers and Bursens, 2006). How Flanders dealt with the 
shaping and taking in the cases will be discussed below. First we shortly present the two cases 
followed by an evaluation of the adpatation. 
The data for the two case studies were collected through a qualitative interview round 
between February and May 2006. It involved face-to-face interviews with Flemish and 
Belgian federal administrators, cabinet workers, members of parliament and members of civil 
society-groups. In addition a document analysis and a literature review were carried out.  
 
Council regulation on the European sugar reform (2006/318/EC) 
The sugar reform aims to bring the EU sugar sector in line with the rest of the 
reformed Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). According to the European Commission, this 
regulation will ensure a long-term sustainable future for sugar production in the EU, enhance 
the competitiveness of the sector and strengthen the EU's position in the current round of 
world trade talks. The key to the reform is a 36 percent cut in the guaranteed minimum sugar 
price over 4 years. Farmers will be compensated for, on average, 64.2 percent of the price cut 
through a decoupled payment - which will be linked to respect for environmental and land 
management standards and added to the Single Farm Payment. Additional aid has been built 
in for those countries which will reduce their output by more than half, or even phase out 
sugar production completely. The EU production is expected to fall by between 6 and 7 
million ton. EU exports will fall dramatically, allowing the EU to respect its WTO 
commitments. The reforms will also affect sugar producers in the developing world. An 
assistance plan is set up to compensate the ACP countries and the EU will open its market 
completely to imports from the world’s 49 poorest countries from 2009.  
 
In the shaping phase of the sugar reform, Flanders clearly acted proactive. It was able 
to define its policy preferences into a single Flemish position. In addition, also the 
interregional coordination occurred smoothly with Flanders taking up an important role. The 
Flemish position was well reflected in the Belgian position defended by the federal minister   12
of agriculture (cf. the Cooperation Agreement 2003b). Next to the intra-Belgian coordination, 
the Flemish level employed a strategy that circumvented the federal level: efforts were made 
to build coalitions with other member states. In the end Flanders, as a region, was able to play 
a decisive role in the development of the final European agreement.  
The taking phase, which is still going on, runs smoothly as well, partly thanks to the 
effective shaping. The deadline for implementation has not yet passed, but if the 
implementation continues in the same way, no problems are expected. From the information 
of the interviews, we can clearly conclude that the Flemish shaping and talking behavior in 
the sugar reform is very satisfactory.  
 
Directive relating to the assessment and management of environmental noise 
(2002/49/EC) 
In June 2002 the EU adopted a directive aiming to avoid, prevent or reduce, in a 
common European way, the harmful effects of exposure to environmental noise. This 
directive was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in co-decision. In a first 
stage, member states have to map noise by means of a common method. This mapping will be 
executed with two deadlines: by 2007 noise impact of the mayor roads, railways and airports 
has to be measured, while the remaining roads, railways and airports have to be mapped by 
2012.  In a second stage, all member states need to develop and implement action plans at the 
local level. Member states are to ensure that the strategic noise maps and the action plans are 
made available and disseminated to the public. The directive also serves as a basis for 
developing Community measures concerning noise sources.  
 
Since 2003, the Belgian position in the Environment Council is defended by a regional 
minister of environment. At the time of the noise directives formulation, however, the Belgian 
position was still defended by the federal environmental minister with only an assessor-role 
for the regional minister. Nevertheless, Flanders was involved in the process from the very 
beginning. To be really proactive, e.g. in terms of impact analysis, the Flemish expert lacked 
the means. There was also no consensus on the definition of the Flemish policy preferences, 
making it impossible to determine the best outcome of the European negotiation process. The 
only clear Flemish policy preference was the exclusion of any binding noise thresholds. No 
constructive amendments were formulated. In short, Flanders had no real common position to 
be defended at the Belgian or the European level. The shaping capacity of Flanders was 
clearly much smaller in the case of environmental noise than in the case of the sugar reform.   13
  Partly as a result of this, also the Flemish taking capacity was limited. Formal 
transposition was executed too late and it is also very doubtful whether Flanders will be able 
to reach the deadlines of the different implementation phases of directive. Overall we can 
conclude that not only the Flemish performance in the uploading phase, but also the handling 
of the downloading phase was not satisfactory.    
 
Table 2: degree of adaptation 
  
 
noise directive  sugar regulation 
degree of adaptation     unsatisfactory satisfactory 
type of misfit  policy misfit 
institutional misfit 
  
domestic variables  H1: veto-players  
H2: facilitating formal institutions 
H3: administrative resources 
H4: norm entrepreneurs  
H5: facilitating  informal institutions 
H6: issue salience 
  
 
In the next sections we will examine whether our hypotheses concerning the goodness 
of fit and the domestic intervening variables are good predictors for the shaping and taking 
behavior of the Flemish region as described in the previous paragraphs. 
 
 
5. Institutional and policy misfit in the noise directive and the sugar regulation  
 
This paper aims to test the feasibility of hypotheses with regard to a number of 
intervening variables derived from institutionalist theory. These variables are supposed to 
play a mediating role between the adaptation pressure posed by European policies on the one 
hand and the domestic adaptation on the other hand. According to institutional reasoning 
(Börzel 1999, Duina 1999, Héritier 1996), adaptation pressure is present in situations of 
misfit. Hence, before analyzing the shaping and taking by Flanders, we need to evaluate the 
presence or absence of this - institutional or policy - misfit. 
    14
Policy misfit occurs in case of a divergence between the content of the EU policy and 
the existing national legal framework. This is clearly the case in both cases. The establishment 
of a common European sugar market is new and therefore does not correspondent with any 
existing national legal framework. The directive concerning environmental noise doesn’t 
correspond with existing national legal frameworks either since almost no noise policy existed 
in Flanders or in Belgium. Institutional misfit, on the other hand, can only be defined as high 
in the case the noise directive. In this sector there was clearly no domestic institutional 
framework that could be activated for up- and downloading the European policy. The 
European sugar reform didn’t cause important institutional challenges since this reform was in 
line with the overall reform of the CAP.  The presence of a policy misfit in both cases, and the 
presence of institutional misfit in only one case are interesting from a theoretical point of view 
since they offer empirical variation in adaptation pressure. It allows us to ask whether our 
hypotheses hold in two different situations.  
 
Table 3: type of misfit 
  
 
noise directive  sugar regulation 
degree of adaptation     unsatisfactory satisfactory 
type of misfit  policy misfit 
institutional misfit 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
domestic variables  H1: veto-players  
H2: facilitating formal institutions 
H3: administrative resources 
H4: norm entrepreneurs  
H5: facilitating  informal institutions 
H6: issue salience 
  
 
 
6. Shaping and taking explained: the impact of domestic factors on regional adaptation 
 
The specific characteristics of Belgian federalism imply that Flanders is confronted 
with a substantial number of formal veto points when dealing with European policy-making. 
A crucial feature is the absence of a hierarchy of norms: federal and regional laws stand on 
equal footing, implying that each level has to prepare and implement European policies that   15
fall inside its competences. In 1993 a constitutional reform granted the Regions and the 
Communities the right to embark in external relations for each policy sector that belongs to 
their domestic competences. This in foro interno, in foro externo principle includes the right 
to co-direct Belgian European policy making as far as regional competences are involved. 
Regions and Communities have a formal veto-right in the determination of every position of 
the Belgian federation for the Council of Ministers. However, a gentlemen’s agreement 
stipulates that this right is only exercised when their competences are at stake. Since both 
agriculture and environmental policy are regional competences, a consensus has to be reached 
to formulate every position Belgium will defend in European arenas dealing with agricultural 
or environmental issues. In other words, both policy sectors are characterized by a high 
number of governmental veto players. In the sugar reform case, the broadly defined private 
sugar sector was an additional veto player. In both cases horizontal overlaps with other policy 
domains brought additional formal veto-players to the playing field. One prominent example 
of a veto-player in the sugar reform was the department of foreign affairs for aspects dealing 
with WTO and development aid. With respect to the noise directive, the departments of 
transport, traffic and roads were equally involved in the construction of noise maps and action 
plans. Following the first rational choice inspired hypothesis, the large number of veto players 
should lead in both cases to uncomfortable policy shaping conditions. Our empirical data, 
however, only offer confirmation for the environmental case. The presence of multiple veto 
players can therefore not be considered as a necessary condition for failing uploading 
behavior. In other words, other compensating domestic factors have to play a role as well. 
 
Cooperation in European policy-making between the federal and the regional level is 
necessary, since the federated entities cannot act in their own right towards the EU and since 
the federal government cannot conduct foreign policies in areas of regional competency 
(Kerremans, 2000). Both the federal and the subnational level have therefore a joint interest in 
mutual assistance and cooperation. The federated entities are confronted with a hollowing out 
of their competences as a consequence of European integration and try to compensate for this 
loss of political control through participation in formal coordination mechanisms (Börzel 
2002; Kovziridze 2002). Geeraerts (2003) for instance claims that with respect to European 
environmental policy-making, Flanders chooses for a cooperative strategy instead of a 
confrontational circumventing strategy (2003). This seems odd since Belgium is often 
characterized as an example of confrontational federalism (Börzel 2002; Van Reybroeck, 
Helsen et al. 2003). However, when European issues are involved, subnational governments   16
and the federal government alike are forced to work together (Beyers and Bursens 2006). To 
foster cooperation, a formal system of coordination was established based on consensus-
seeking and ministerial autonomy. Several levels of coordination were introduced, ranging 
from sectoral coordination on the regional level to general coordination on the inter-federal 
level. A Cooperation Agreement between all levels (signed in 1994 and updated in 2003) 
formalized the direct involvement of the Regions and Communities in to the coordination 
processes (see Beyers and Bursens 2006b for an overview of the Belgian coordination 
mechanisms).  
 
Because agriculture is a longstanding and highly Europeanized policy domain, Belgian 
authorities have established formal coordination structures and informal networks. The recent 
regionalization of agricultural policy was incorporated smoothly in these mechanisms. On top 
of this, the sugar case revealed rather parallel interests, allowing formal coordination 
mechanisms to deliver output in a smooth and efficient way. In the noise case, on the 
contrary, the domestic institutional uploading conditions were far from ideal. Recently, major 
reforms have been introduced, but in the period of policy formulation of the noise directive, 
these were not yet in place. One example is the so-called pilot-system that allows the 
monitoring of a European environmental issue from the proactive phase to the implementation 
and policy correction phase. This system was not operational at the time, causing other than 
environmental departments to be only involved very late. In other words, domestic formal 
institutions were not facilitating in the noise case. Overall, data from the interviews point out 
that the presence of elaborated formal institutional structures seem to foster efficient shaping 
and taking of European policies. The absence of elaborated formal structures in the noise case 
seems to correlate with a low shaping and taking capacity while the presence of these 
institutions in the sugar case seem to be stimulating factor for the smooth handling of the 
European policy issues.  
 
The third domestic factor that is expected to have an impact on the shaping and taking 
of EU policies is the amount of administrative resources available to those responsible for 
European dossiers. With respect to the European sugar reform, administrative resources were, 
both before and after the regionalization of agriculture policy, well elaborated: contrary to 
what was expected, regionalization didn’t lead to a lack of administrative capacity in 
Flanders. Interviews reveal that Flemish (and Belgian) experts were able to play a decisive 
role in the expert and consultative committees of the European Commission, partly because   17
their strategy was based on impact analyses by the administration and the sugar sector. Also 
during the taking phase administrative resources of the Flemish agricultural administration 
seemed to have been adequate enough to foster smooth implementation. While this evaluation 
doesn’t mean that administrative capacity alone can guarantee effective adaptation, the 
empirical evidence from the sugar case suggests that successful shaping and taking benefits 
from a high level of administrative resources. 
The noise case, on the contrary, presents itself as a dossier with a substantially smaller 
amount of supporting resources. Regionalization of environmental competences in the 90’s 
divided environmental expertise over the three Regions. Policy on noise pollution in particular 
has been badly served in terms of personnel and resources. This lack of resources resulted in a 
shortage of basic factual information about the situation of noise pollution in Flanders, 
hampering the Flemish experts to make a profound impact analysis of the draft EU-directive 
and causing a rather passive behavior during EU decision-making procedures. Only one single 
Flemish expert was involved in the early stages of the directive. As a consequence, the formal 
Flemish cooperation mechanisms were not activated but replaced by informal contacts 
between the expert and the cabinet of the Flemish environment minister. Because of the 
limited political salience and the technical nature of the directive, these contacts worked 
smoothly. The implementation phase is still going on. It has already become clear, however, 
that much more personnel and resources are necessary to meet the EU-deadlines. Departments 
of transport, traffic and roads were only involved very late while there input for the 
construction of ‘noise maps’ and action plans is indispensable.  
In short, the considerable differences in administrative resources confirm our 
hypothesis: substantial administrative resources in the sugar case correlate with efficient 
shaping and taking, while the under-resourced noise case was – and still is – characterized by 
a deficient tackling of the matter. 
 
The presence and active involvement of norm entrepreneurs is a next domestic factor 
that is assumed to influence the domestic EU approach. In the sugar reform, the well-
organized and very active Flemish/Belgian sugar lobby can be regarded as such a crucial 
norm entrepreneur. Realizing the major impact of the sugar reform proposals, this lobby 
played a significant role in the initial stages of the process, resulting in an influential position 
with respect to the formation of the Flemish/Belgian position. On their request, for instance, a 
special taskforce was installed to ensure a continuous screening of the development of the 
proposal. With respect to noise directive, we could not detect norm entrepreneurs of real   18
significance. While environmental lobby groups were expected to be attentive and influential, 
in practice, no single stakeholder actively lobbied Flemish or Belgian political or 
administrative actors. None of the stakeholders considered the directive as vital since no hard 
commitments but only less compelling features such as information collection were 
envisaged. In short, also the role of norm entrepreneurs differs in the two cases, but equally 
reveals that the hypothesized relation between the presence of norm entrepreneurs and smooth 
adaptation is confirmed.  
  
The presence of informal cooperative institutions is assumed to increase the chances 
for a successful adaptation process. In this respect, several authors have described the 
cooperative behavior of Belgian governmental levels when dealing with European issues. 
Beyers and Bursens (2006) have argued that European integration forces subnational and 
federal governments to cooperate, leading to a shift from de iure competitive federalism 
towards a de facto cooperative federal system. Earlier, Kerremans (2000) had already pointed 
out that the federal and the regional level are simply forced to cooperate, since regional 
entities cannot act in their own right at the European level while at the same time the Belgian 
federal government is not allowed to conduct foreign policies with respect to the competences 
of Regions and Communities. The constitutional provision that Belgium has to abstain when 
no common position is reached in the domestic arena, triggers a joint interest in mutual 
assistance and cooperation. In the case of the sugar reform, such informal institutional 
networks were found to be very important. Civil servants of the Walloon, Flemish and Federal 
administration still knew each other personally, as a result of the recent regionalization. 
Interregional (between the Regions) and inter-federal (between the Regions and the federal 
level) relations among experts were numerous, both in terms of formal institutions and 
informal networks. In both policy cases informal coordination sometimes rendered formal 
institutional steps obsolete or only necessary for rubberstamping informally reached 
agreements. This cooperative political culture clearly facilitated the up- and download 
capacities in these policy issues through mechanisms as information and burden sharing. In 
addition, political fragmentation, which is assumed to have a negative impact on cooperative 
behavior, was relatively low in both cases. In the environmental case Flemish and Belgian 
experts ware able to approach the dossier from a very technical perspective without much 
political interference. Although the sugar case triggered much more political debate, the 
involved interests and preferences converged relatively well. In short, the sugar regulation 
brought exactly what was expected: a collaborative reflex and a successful adaptation process.   19
The noise directive, on the other hand, seems to more puzzling. Empirical data equally reveal 
informal cooperative institutions at work but showed no smooth shaping and taking of the 
European policy.  
 
Issue salience was presented as a last intermediating factor. High salience of a 
European policy issue is assumed to trigger early and intensive activity of private actors and 
public authorities and therefore to be beneficial to efficient adaptation. The two cases clearly 
diverge in this respect. While salience was relatively low in the noise case, it was much higher 
in the sugar reform. The latter easily follows from the substantive budgetary stakes of the 
regulation: a substantial profit or loss for Flanders - and Belgium in general – was at stake. 
Interest groups, political elites and administrations were alarmed in early stages of the 
procedure. Also the low salience of the noise case can be derived from the nature of the 
directive. Presented as a kind of framework legislation, the directive focused in the first place 
on harmonization of data collection, monitoring and planning leaving aside hard 
commitments. While it is likely that follow-up legislation will include hard indicators and 
commitments, the scope of these targets was very difficult to assess during the development 
of the first directive. The domestic ‘noise community’ decided that there was relatively little 
to lose and acted according to this assessment. Concluding, the difference in issue salience 
and the corresponding attention EU policy issues receive from domestic actors seems to work 
out empirically as predicted. High relevance and successful adaptation in the agriculture 
sector opposed to low salience and less efficient tackling of EU legislation in the 
environmental sector.   
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
The puzzle of this paper was embedded in the institutional approach of the 
Europeanization literature. We tried to find out if and understand how subnational entities 
adapt under the pressure of European integration. More in particular, this paper aims at testing 
whether the combined institutional mechanisms of goodness of fit and mediating domestic 
factors offer sufficient understanding of adaptational behavior by regions of member states. 
We argued that, because hardly any Europeanization literature deals with the subnational 
level, the question whether the institutional approach of Europeanization is useful to study 
regional adaptation to European integration, is a very relevant one to ask. Empirical data for 
this exercise were derived from the Flemish adjustment to legislative proposals in EU   20
agriculture and environmental policy. In terms of research design we tested whether six 
domestic variables could predict the shaping and taking behavior of the Flemish regional 
level: veto players, formal institutions, administrative resources, norm entrepreneurs, informal 
institutions and issue salience.   
 
Table 4 presents an overview of the empirical test of the hypotheses that were derived 
from institutional theoretical insights. Let us first discuss the type of misfit. It was clear from 
the empirical data that in both cases the Flemish level was confronted with a misfit in terms of 
policy content, while only the noise case suffered from an institutional misfit. Reasoning 
purely from goodness of fit logic, the sugar case should result in a more satisfactory 
adaptation than the noise case. The description of the shaping and taking behavior in both 
cases indeed confirms that goodness of fit is a first step in understanding regional adjustment 
to European integration. Goodness of fit, however, doesn’t tell the whole story. We still 
needed to explain why the policy misfit didn’t cause more problems in the agriculture case. 
Adding insights from institutional theory expose the mechanisms through which the 
adaptation processes take place. It offers understanding of the importance of domestic factors.  
 
Table 4: domestic mediating variables 
  
 
noise directive  sugar regulations 
degree of adaptation    unsatisfactory satisfactory 
type of misfit  policy misfit 
institutional misfit 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
domestic  variables  H1: absence of veto-players  
H2: facilitating formal institutions 
H3: administrative resources 
H4: norm entrepreneurs  
H5: facilitating informal institutions 
H6: issue salience 
no 
no 
no 
no 
yes 
no 
no 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
 
With respect to these domestic variables, a ‘yes’ in table 4 means that the factor is 
present while a ‘no’ points to the absence of the factor. In the sugar case, this means that 
policy misfit was compensated by the presence of formal and informal facilitating institutions, 
administrative resources and norm entrepreneurs and a high salience of the issue. In other   21
words, policy misfit doesn’t have to result in unsatisfactory adaptation as long as the domestic 
context is favorable. The only domestic variable that doesn’t work is the presence of veto-
points. While the agriculture case was characterized by a substantial number of veto-points, 
this didn’t seem to hamper the rather efficient adaptation in the sugar dossier. The noise case 
further refines our analysis. It was found that Flanders wasn’t able to deal with EU legislation 
in a satisfactory manner. Misfit, both in terms of policies and institutions, seem to play a role. 
In addition, also the presence of veto-players, the absence of formal institutions, enough 
resources, and active norm entrepreneurs and the low salience of the issue didn’t help to 
overcome the misfit. We also point out that the presence of informal cooperative institutions 
in the noise case is not sufficient to compensate for policy and institutional misfit, hence 
adding an important nuance to the findings in the sugar case. Summing up, formal institutions 
and resources on the one hand and norm entrepreneurs and issue salience on the other hand 
pop up as crucial domestic variables to explain regional adaptation to European integration. In 
other words, both rational and sociological institutionalisms seem to offer explanations in the 
Europeanization debate. 
Overall, we conclude that what the institutional literature established with regard to 
the central governmental level also applies for the subnational governmental level. Although 
based on empirical evidence of only two cases and in only one region, the explanatory power 
of institutionalism can be confirmed. Whether it holds in other sectors and in other member 
states remains to be seen. We have to wait for empirical analyses in this sphere. 
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